Humans and other animals need to make decisions under varying degrees of uncertainty. These decisions are strongly influenced by an individual's risk preference; however, the neuronal circuitry by which risk preference shapes choice is still unclear [1] . Supplementary eye field (SEF), an oculomotor area within primate medial frontal cortex, is thought to be an essential part of the neuronal circuit underlying oculomotor decision making, including decisions under risk [2] [3] [4] [5] . Consistent with this view, risk-related action value and monitoring signals have been observed in SEF [6] [7] [8] . However, such activity has also been observed in other frontal areas, including orbitofrontal [9] [10] [11] , cingulate [12] [13] [14] , and dorsallateral frontal cortex [15] . It is thus unknown whether the activity in SEF causally contributes to risky decisions, or whether it is merely a reflection of neural processes in other cortical regions. Here, we tested a causal role of SEF in risky oculomotor choices. We found that SEF inactivation strongly reduced the frequency of risky choices. This reduction was largely due to a reduced attraction to reward uncertainty and high reward gain, but not due to changes in the subjective estimation of reward probability or average expected reward. Moreover, SEF inactivation also led to increased sensitivity to differences between expected and actual reward during free choice. Nevertheless, it did not affect adjustments of decisions based on reward history.
RESULTS

Monkeys Are Risk Seeking
In our gambling task, two monkeys (Macaca mulatta, A and I) had to choose between two gambles with different combinations of maximum reward amount and winning probability ( Figure 1A ; STAR Methods). Risk was quantified as reward uncertainty, using standard economic models [16] [17] [18] .
The monkeys used the gamble cues in an economically rational way. They consistently selected gambles with higher reward amount (error rates: monkey A: 9.22%; monkey I: 1.99%; Figure 2A ) and higher winning probability (error rates: monkey A: 4.94%; monkey I: 2.75%; Figure 2A ) when the other attribute was matched. Overall, the monkeys clearly preferred options with higher expected value (EV) (Figures S1A, S1B, S1H, and S1I). The monkeys were also risk seeking, consistent with many previous studies [6, 10, 19, 20] . For gambles with identical EV, both monkeys preferred the gamble option with the higher outcome variance, i.e., higher risk ( Figure 2B ; t test; monkey A: P(choose more risky option) = 79.01%, p = 2.37 3 10 À6 ; monkey I: P(choose more risky option) = 73.40%, p = 5.19 3 10 À4 ).
We quantified the monkeys' risk preference using two standard economic models: the risk-value and the prospect theory models (STAR Methods). The risk-value model is derived from financial theory and decomposes the subjective value of each option into a weighted linear combination of EV and variance risk, computed as the variance (Var) of the gamble outcomes [10, 16, 17] . It outperformed models using only the EV or the Var term, and models using coefficient of variance of the gamble outcomes, an alternative measure of risk [21] (Table S2 ). The monkeys preferred options with higher EV ( Figure 2C The prospect theory model is derived from expected utility theory and estimates subjective value using a non-linear utility and probability weighting function [9, 21, 22] . This model predicted the monkeys' choice behavior better than models using either utility or probability weighting functions alone, and also slightly better than the risk-value model (Table S2) likelihood of obtaining them when the winning probability was low, leading to risk-seeking behavior. Thus, both economic models indicated a strong preference for riskier options. In contrast, there was only very weak evidence for directional bias (risk-value model: t test; combined: 
SEF Inactivation Reduces Risk Seeking
SEF neurons encode action value signals that reflect the subjective value of options in the oculomotor gambling task and are correlated with the monkeys' choices [8] . To test whether these signals have a causal effect on decision making, we examined whether bilateral inactivation of SEF influenced monkeys' behavior in the oculomotor gambling task, using a cryoplate (Figures 1C and 1D ). This method allows us to quickly and reversibly inactivate SEF in both hemispheres [23] . We monitored neuronal activity in both SEF hemispheres during control and inactivation conditions. Consistent with previous reports [24, 25] , the spiking activity decreased with decreasing temperature in both (B) Two sets of gamble options (option matrix 1 and option matrix 2) used in the gambling task. In a given session, we presented seven possible gamble options with three levels of maximum reward amount and three levels of winning probability (see Figure S1 ). Each option stimulus contains two colors. There are four different colors in total (cyan, red, blue, and green), indicating four different reward amounts (increasing from 1, 3, and 5 to 9 units of water; 1 unit, 30 mL of water). The proportions of the areas covered by the colors indicate the probability of receiving the corresponding reward. The expected value of the gamble targets increases along the axis indicated by the arrows (see Figure S2 ). (C) Cryoinactivation experiment setup. The black square in the left subplot indicates the position of the cooling plate during bilateral inactivation. The black dots within the square indicate the recording sites at which neurophysiological recordings were performed during inactivation. Red dots indicate the recording sites where task-related neuronal activity was recorded in separate experiments. Blue dots indicate the recording sites with no task-related neuronal activities. The black square indicates the cooling plate covers the majority of the cortical area with task-related activity.
(D) The cooling device consist of three parts: the cooling plate (10 mm 3 12 mm), the brown plastic cap, which stabilizes the whole cooling device in the recording chamber, and the two micro-drives, which hold two tungsten electrodes monitoring the neuronal activity during inactivation. (E) A representative experimental session. The first row shows the on-and offset of the cooling device. The second row shows the temperature recorded at the cooling plate, right above the dura. The shaded green area indicates the temperature range defined as the control state, and the shaded orange area indicates the temperature range defined as the inactivation state. The third and fourth rows show the multi-unit spiking activities recorded simultaneously in both left (the third row) and right (the fourth row) SEF (see Figure S2 ).
hemispheres ( Figures 1E and S2 ). Neuronal activity was less affected as distance increased between the recording sites and the cooling plate ( Figure S2 ), so that the cooling effect was restricted to SEF. In total, we performed 31 bilateral inactivation sessions (monkey A: 16 sessions; monkey I: 15 sessions), with an average of 1,399 successful trials and 7 periods of inactivation per session. The effect of SEF inactivation on risky choice was highly consistent across the two monkeys. During inactivation, we observed in both monkeys some small changes in saccade metrics ( Figure S3 ), fixation stability ( Figure S3 ), and reaction times ( Figure S4A ; Table S3 ), consistent with previous findings [26] [27] [28] [29] . These changes in oculomotor behavior were too small to affect choice. SEF inactivation caused only small and inconsistent changes in error rate when the options only differed in either winning probability or magnitude ( Figure 3A) . Therefore, SEF inactivation did not affect the ability of the monkeys to use the visual cues for economically rational choices. Nevertheless, both monkeys showed a significantly altered pattern of choice during SEF inactivation: they were consistently less risk seeking ( Figures 3C and 3E) . The monkeys showed reduced risk preference in 90% (28/31) of inactivation sessions as measured by the risk-value and prospect theory models.
In the risk-value model, the risk term (Var) coefficients were significantly smaller during inactivation compared to the control condition ( Figure 3C; Figure 3B ; paired t test; combined: DP(choose higher risk option) = 6.97%, p = 1.46 3 10
À3
; monkey A: DP(choose higher risk option) = 4.29%, p = 0.05; monkey I: DP(choose higher risk option) = 9.66%, p = 0.01). The monkeys' choices were also less determined by EV differences during inactivation ( Figure 3D ; paired t test; combined: Db EV = 0.90, Db EV /b EV = 16%, p = 0.01; monkey A: Db EV = 1.10, Db EV /b EV = 21%, p = 0.01; monkey I:
. Across all trials, the monkeys chose the smaller EV option significantly more often (paired t test; combined: DP(choose lower EV option) = 1.71%, p = 3.63 3 10
À4
; monkey A: DP(choose lower EV option) = 1.46%, p = 5.39 3 10
À3
; monkey I: DP(choose lower EV option) = 1.97%, p = 0.02). However, this effect was less pronounced than the one resulting from the lower preference for risk ( Figure S4B ).
In the prospect theory model, the utility functions of both monkeys were less convex during inactivation (Figures 3E and 3G; paired t test; combined: Dr = À0.11, p = 6.32 3 10 À6 ; monkey A: Dr = À0.07, p = 2.00 3 10 À3 ; monkey I: Dr = À0.14, p = 7.35 3 10 À4 ). The monkeys showed less overestimation of high reward amounts during inactivation. In contrast, the probability weighting function, which captures the monkeys' estimation of the probability of winning, remained unchanged (Figures 3F and 3G; paired t test; combined: Da = À0.09, p = 0.17; monkey A: Da = 0.02, p = 0.59; monkey I: Da = À0.08, p = 0.06).
We tested whether changes in motor strategies could explain this preference change, because manipulation of dopaminergic 
Figure 2. Monkeys Show Risk-Seeking Behavior
(A) The monkeys showed first-order stochastic dominance. They strongly preferred the gamble option with the higher probability or higher amount, when the other factor (reward amount or probability) was held constant.
(B) The monkeys were risk seeking. They strongly preferred the gamble option with higher variance, when expected value was identical for both gamble options. This preference increased with increasing variance differences.
(C) The risk-value model explains choices between two gamble options as a function of outcome variance differences (DVar), expected value differences (DEV), and directional bias (Dir). The regression coefficients for DVar and DEV for both monkeys are significantly different from 0 (t test, p < 10 À4 ) (monkey A: black; monkey I: blue). The
Var coefficients are positive, indicating attraction to risk. The regression coefficients for Dir are not significantly different from 0. Each dot represents an estimated regression coefficient for one experimental session.
(D) The prospect theory model explains choices between two gamble options as a function of the non-linear utility of outcomes, weighted by a non-linear probability function, and the directional bias. The estimated coefficients for both utility and probability distortion are significantly different from 1 (t test, p < 10 À4 ). The estimated coefficients for direction are slightly above 0 (t test, p < 0.05).
(E) The estimated power utility functions for both monkeys. The thin lines denote the individual session estimations, whereas the thick lines denote the average estimation. The utility functions are convex, indicating risk seeking (monkey A: black; monkey I: blue).
(F) The estimated probability weighting function using the 1-parameter Prelec weighting function for both monkeys. The color scheme is similar to (E). Error bars denote SEM; ns, non-significant; *p < 0.05, ***p < 10 Error bars denote SEM; paired t test; ns, non-significant; **p < 10 À2 , ***p < 10 À3 , ****p < 10 À4 . See SEF inactivation effect on saccade reaction times in Table S3 .
See reduction of risk seeking estimated by the prospect theory model separately for both monkeys in Figure S4C .
receptors in frontal eye field can change positional bias and the tendency to repeat actions [30] . The reduced risk seeking reflects therefore a true change in choice preference.
SEF Inactivation Increases Trial Desertion after Gamble Loss
During the result epoch, SEF neurons encode reward prediction error (RPE), the difference between expected and actual reward [6] . RPE signals are thought to guide reinforcement learning and updating of action value signals [6, 30] . We therefore tested whether SEF inactivation influenced the monkeys' sensitivity to these locally encoded RPE signals. Following the loss of a gamble, both monkeys occasionally actively broke fixation by making a saccade outside of the fixation window ( Figure S3C ), thus deserting the trial before reward delivery. This behavior was maladaptive, because it did not change the outcome of the trial, and substantially prolonged the time until reward delivery, as well as the time until the next chance to make a choice. Trial desertion developed spontaneously, was sensitive to negative RPE, and increased with larger errors ( Figure 4A ). Interestingly, the desertion rate was significantly higher in choice trials In addition, desertion rates also significantly increased in all other task epochs of choice trials during inactivation (Figure S4) . Thus, outcome monitoring signals in SEF were not necessary to drive desertion behavior. On the contrary, SEF activity seems to be necessary to suppress desertion behavior throughout the task, but in particular following aversive events following free choices ( Figures 4A and 4B ).
SEF Inactivation Does Not Affect Reward-HistoryDependent Adjustments of Risk Preference
Both monkeys showed a significant change of risk preference depending on the preceding gamble outcome. They were less risk seeking when they had lost the previous gamble than when they had won it. In the risk-value model, this manifested itself in a significant difference in the Var coefficient ( Figure 4C 
DISCUSSION
Decision-related activity has been observed in many brain regions [31] . However, it remains unknown whether this activity is causally related to the decision process [32] [33] [34] . Here we showed that SEF, an oculomotor area within medial frontal cortex, does play a causal role in regulating risky and impulsive behavior in oculomotor decisions. SEF is only one among a number of cortical [1, 13, 15, 35] and subcortical [14, [36] [37] [38] brain areas that contribute to decision making under risk. However, the effect of SEF inactivation is not a simple decrease in decision accuracy, as would be expected if SEF operates in parallel with other areas that contain redundant signals, so that SEF inactivation merely reduces the overall strength of the decision variable. Instead, SEF seems to selectively mediate the effect of risk preferences, but not EV, on choice. Eliminating these signals cannot be fully compensated for by other parts of the decision-making circuit.
Risk preference is often seen as a fundamental, stable personality trait [39] . However, the risk preference of individuals can vary substantially across different behavioral domains [40] . Even when tested only within the financial domain, risk preference varies [41] . These findings suggest that risk preference is not a stable personality trait but rather emerges during decision making in a context-dependent manner. Risk attitude depends on beliefs about the environment, the set of available options, and the contingencies governing action outcomes [42] . In the context of our experimental task, the small stakes and large number of trials most likely reduced the averseness of losing a gamble and thus induced risk-seeking behavior [41, 42] . These contextual factors are not directly observable and must be inferred. Nevertheless, they are important elements of a cognitive representation of task space [43] . A recent study [42] shows that rhesus monkeys show very different utility and probability weighting functions when tested with different gambling tasks. This supports the hypothesis of the use of flexible cognitive processes in constructing risk attitudes in a context-dependent fashion.
A number of cortical areas might be important in influencing risk attitude. Orbital frontal cortex (OFC) is involved in representing task space [44, 45] and contains risk-selective neurons [10, 35] . Recent lesion experiments in macaques indicate also a role of ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC) in learning and encoding the probability of reward outcomes [46] . In addition, anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) has also been shown to be correlated with risk uncertainty [12] [13] [14] . SEF receives synaptic input from frontal areas including OFC, VLPFC, and ACC, and projects 
Figure 4. Influence of SEF Inactivation on Desertion Rates and Gamble History Effect
(A) Desertion rates during result periods as a function of reward expectation errors, the differences between actual and anticipated reward, during control (green) and inactivation (orange) conditions in choice trials (top) and no-choice trials (bottom). The overall desertion rates are estimated using an exponential fit, indicated by the colored lines. These rates are significantly increased during inactivation in choice trials. This increase is larger with larger negative prediction errors. Trial desertion here is defined as making saccades actively outside of the fixation windows (see Figures S3C and S3D ). See Figure S4 for trial quitting rates in other task epochs.
(legend continued on next page)
to the frontal eye field and superior colliculus [47] . It integrates sensory and task context information to guide the selection of appropriate actions [5] . Thus, the effect of SEF inactivation most likely reflects the diminished influence of these belief states about the task structure, so that the subjective value of a gamble option is less determined by risk preference. Perturbations of dopaminergic activity can also modulate risky choices [36, [48] [49] [50] . In rodents, ventral tegmental area stimulation after non-rewarded choices increased subsequent willingness to choose a risky gamble [48] . In contrast to modulating risk preference by changing cognitive processes, these perturbations most likely change choice behavior by modulating EV updates using model-free learning mechanisms. The fact that SEF inactivation does not affect reward-history-dependent EV adjustments suggests the independent contributions of two different brain circuits to the evaluation of uncertain reward options: risk preference is associated with a goal-directed frontalcortex-based circuit, including SEF, whereas EV representation is associated with a more automatic subcortical circuit.
The monkeys sometimes desert the trial following an unexpected loss. This behavior most likely represents an automatic response to the aversive outcome, especially following free choices. The fact that SEF inactivation increased this behavior, but only during free choice trials, cannot be explained by the fixation quality during inactivation ( Figure S3 ; STAR Methods). Instead, it suggests that SEF activity contributes to self-control by suppressing automatic, but maladaptive, responses and promoting behavior that maximizes long-term reward. Such a role would be consistent with the well-known contribution of SEF to other forms of executive control [5, 51] .
In conclusion, our results demonstrate for the first time the causal role of SEF in mediating the effect of risk preference on decisions under uncertainty. These findings provide new insight into the neuronal circuits underlying inconsistent, contextdependent choices under risk observed across humans [18, 41, 52] and non-human primates [53] , and may provide the basis for more effective treatments of highly maladaptive impulsive risky behaviors.
STAR+METHODS
Detailed methods are provided in the online version of this paper and include the following: 
KEY RESOURCES TABLE CONTACT FOR REAGENT AND RESOURCE SHARING
Further information and requests for resources should be directed to and will be fulfilled by the Lead Contact, Veit Stuphorn (veit@jhu. edu).
EXPERIMENTAL MODEL AND SUBJECT DETAILS
All animal care and experimental procedures were in compliance with the US Public Health Service policy on the humane care and use of laboratory animals, and were approved by Johns Hopkins University Animal Care and Use Committee. Two male rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta, Monkey A: 7.5 kg, Monkey I: 7.2 kg) were trained to perform the tasks used in this study. After training, we placed a hexagonal chamber (29 mm in diameter) centered over the midline, 28 mm (Monkey A) and 27 mm (Monkey I) anterior of the interaural line.
METHOD DETAILS
Electrophysiological techniques
During each bilateral inactivation session, single units were recorded using two tungsten microelectrodes with an impedance of 2-4 MUs (Frederick Haer, Bowdoinham, ME), one in each hemisphere ( Figure 1C) . The microelectrodes were advanced, using a self-built microdrive system. Data were collected using the PLEXON system (Plexon, Dallas, TX). The electrodes penetrated the cortex perpendicular to the surface of the SEF. The depths of the neurons were estimated by their recording locations relative to the surface of the cortex.
Behavioral task
In the task, the monkeys had to make saccades to peripheral targets that were associated with different reward amounts and probabilities ( Figure 1A) . The targets were colored squares, 2.25 3 2.25 in size. They were always presented 10 away from the central fixation point at a 45, 135, 225, or 315
angle. There were 7 different gamble targets ( Figure 1B ), each consisting of two colors corresponding to the two possible reward amounts. The portion the target filled with each color corresponded to the probability of receiving the corresponding reward amount. Four different colors indicated four different reward amounts (increasing from 1, 3, 5 to 9 units of water, where 1 unit equaled 30 mL). The minimum reward amount for the gamble option was always 1 unit of water (indicated by cyan), while the maximum reward amount ranged from 3 (red), 5 (blue) to 9 units (green), with three different probabilities of receiving the maximum reward outcome (20, 40, and 80%) . Only gamble options from either option matrix1 or option matrix 2 were used in an experimental session.
The task consisted of two types of trials -choice and no-choice trials. All trials started with the appearance of a fixation point at the center of the screen ( Figure 1C) , on which the monkeys were required to fixate for 500-1000 ms. In choice trials, two targets appeared in two locations that were randomly chosen from across the four quadrants (resulting in 12 distinct possible spatial configurations for each pair of gamble options). Simultaneously, the fixation point disappeared, which indicated to the monkeys that they were now free to choose between the gambles by making a saccade toward one of the targets. Following the choice, the non-chosen target disappeared from the screen. The monkeys were required to keep fixating on the chosen target for 500-600ms, after which the gamble outcome was revealed. The two-colored square changed into a single-colored square associated with the final reward amount. The monkeys were required to continue to fixate on the target for another 300 to 600 ms, during which the result cue was still displayed, until the reward was delivered. We observed quantitatively similar results using both option matrices ( Figure S1 ). We therefore report the combined results in the manuscript. All 7 gamble options in each option matrix were systematically paired with all other options from that matrix. This resulted in 21 different combinations of gamble options in choice trials. The sequence of events in no-choice trials was the same as in choice trials, except that only one target was presented. In these trials, the monkeys had to make a saccade to the given target in order to get the fluid reward.
If the monkey deserted a choice trial before choosing between the gambles, the choice trial was simply repeated. However, if the monkey deserted the trial after the choice, but before reward was delivered, the next trial was an unscheduled no-choice trial. The target shown on this no-choice trial depended on the stage at which the monkey had deserted the preceding trial. If the monkey had deserted before the gamble result was revealed, the target was the previously chosen gamble option. If the monkey had deserted the trial after the gamble result was shown, the target was the previously indicated sure reward that was the gamble outcome. Thus, a gamble option or result was binding, once it was chosen or revealed, respectively. Accordingly, desertion behavior was suboptimal and only reduced the average reward rate across trials.
Cryogenic inactivation apparatus and procedure
To determine the location of the SEF, we obtained magnetic resonance images (MRI) for Monkey A and Monkey I. We used the location of the branch of the arcuate sulcus as an anatomical landmark. Before the inactivation experiment, we identified the SEF by neurophysiology recordings ( Figure 1C) . In both monkeys, we found neurons active during the saccade preparation period in the region from 0 to 11 mm anterior to the genu of the arcuate branch and within 5 mm to 2 mm of the longitudinal fissure. We designated the cortical areas with saccade-preparation related activity as belonging to the SEF [8], consistent with previous studies from our lab and existing literature [54, 55] .
Cooling plates ( Figure 1C ) were used to inactivate the SEF bilaterally (10mm from anterior to posterior and 12mm from left to right). This method allows us to rapidly and repeatedly inactivate a large and confined surface cortical area [23, 56] . The cooling method followed the design by Lomber et al. [23] . Room temperature methanol was pumped through Teflon tubing that passed through a dry ice bath, in which it was reduced to subzero temperature. The chilled methanol was then pumped through a cryoloop attached to a stainless-steel plate placed over the dura, which cooled down the underlying cortical tissue. The methanol was then returned to the same reservoir from which it came to form a closed loop. The cortical temperature on the dura was monitored by a micro-thermocouple attached to the cooling plate. At the same time, two electrodes recorded cortical activity in the left and right hemisphere. During each session, monkeys initially performed the task for 10-15 min in the control state. Then the SEF region was deactivated bilaterally for 10-15 min by pumping chilled methanol through the cryoloop while the task continued. The cortical temperature returned quickly to normal after switching off the methanol pump ( Figure 1E ), while the monkey continuously performed the task. This whole process was repeated throughout the experimental session and resulted on average in 1399 successful trials, which is on average 7 repetitions of control/inactivation cycles. In the control state, the temperature measured at the cooling probe was [35] [36] [37] [38] [39] C. During the inactivation state, the temperature at the cooling plate was reduced to 0-15 C. Transition trials, right after turning on the pump and turning off the pump, with the temperature between 34 and 16 C, were not used in the behavioral analysis. The monkeys were sitting in an acoustic noise-isolated chamber. The methanol pump was placed outside this chamber.
QUANTIFICATION AND STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
In general, two-tailed t tests were used for statistical tests, unless specified otherwise.
Risk behavior analysis
Trial-by-trial data was collected during control and inactivation. We quantified the monkeys' risk behavior using two types of risk models: risk-value models and prospective theory models. All reported p values regarding mean differences between control and inactivation conditions are results of two-tailed paired t tests. p values relating to gamble history effects are based on one-tailed paired t tests.
The risk-value model is derived from financial theory [16] and represents the value of a gamble as the sum of multiple terms related to the distribution of possible gamble outcomes. The first term is the mean value of the gamble outcome distribution (i.e., the expected value of the gamble). The second term is the variance of the gamble outcomes (i.e., variance risk). The sign of this term determines if outcome variance increases (risk-seeking) or decreases (risk-averse) the value of gambles. In the following, we will refer to this second component simply as risk. In more complex models of this type, higher statistical moments describing the outcome distribution (skewness, kurtosis) are also taken into account. However, here we will not use these higher-order terms.
We used logistic regression to quantify the ability of the risk-value model to predict choice behavior. We assumed that choice depended in a stochastic fashion on the difference in subjective value between the two gamble options. We used a soft-max decision function to model this aspect of behavior: convex utility function ðr > 1Þ implies risk seeking, because in this scenario, the subject values large reward amounts disproportionally more than small reward amounts. Gain from winning the gamble thus has a stronger influence on choice than loss from losing the gamble. In the same way, a concave utility function (r < 1) implies risk seeking, because large reward amounts are valued disproportionally less than small ones. Independently, a non-linear weighting of probabilities can also influence risk attitude. For example, a S-shaped probability weighting function (a < 1) implies that the subject overweighs small probabilities and underweights the large probabilities. This would lead to higher willingness to accept a risky gamble, because small probabilities to win large amounts would be overweighted relative to high probabilities to win moderate amounts. As with the variability risk model, we tested three variants of the prospect theory model: 1) a full model, in which both utility function and weighting function were allowed to be non-linear, 2) a 'utility-only' version, in which only the utility function was allowed to be nonlinear, and 3) a 'probability weighting only' version, in which only the probability weighting function was allowed to be non-linear.
Model comparison
The Bayesian information criterion [59, 60] where logðLÞ is the log-likelihood (LL) of the model, n is the number of trials. k is the number of free parameters to be estimated. In addition, we also combined all the trials across different experiment sessions from one monkey in a given task together. We then performed five-fold cross-validation method with different models based [42] . During cross-validation, we randomly divided all the trials into training set (80%) and test set (20%). We used training set to optimize the parameters for a given model, and use the test set to calculate LL to evaluate the model (Table S3 ). Cross validation procedures were repeated 50 times independently for each monkey per task.
Desertion Behavior
We used an exponential function to quantify the monkeys' desertion behavior as a function of reward prediction error during the result period: (Equation 13) where a is the rate parameter. Paired t tests were used to test for significance of any difference in desertion rate in the control and inactivation condition.
DATA AND SOFTWARE AVAILABILITY
Data and software are available upon request to the Lead Contact, Veit Stuphorn (veit@jhu.edu).
